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nate. In his work, Grubb renders a valuable service to historians of other Italian
regions by introducing important local research, such as the many studies of Gian
Maria Varanini and Gigi Corazzols useful work on rural credit, to a much wider
audience.
Wary of the dangers of generalizing from such a narrow base, Grubb is as
cautious in his epilogue as he is in his introductory remarks. This may not be to the
liking of readers who prefer the reassurance of more definite conclusions, but it is
entirely consistent with his aims and is a fitting end to this unduly modest book.
Patricia Allerston
University of Edinburgh
Sue Peabody  “There are no Slaves in France”: The Political Culture of Race
and Slavery in the Ancien Régime. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996. Pp.
x, 210.
This compact study treats the following question: how and why did French public
policy toward black slaves and freedmen of colour living in France change in the
course of the eighteenth century? Sue Peabody approaches this issue by closely
examining royal edicts, declarations, and administrative regulations, as well as law
cases testing these regulations and the correspondence of royal officials and judges
concerning public policy toward slavery and toward people of colour in general.
This is not an exhaustive investigation of law cases, but an in-depth examination
of a few key cases for the purpose of bringing individual contestants and their
lawyers into clear focus. The book also demonstrates jurisdictional and personal
conflicts that created ambiguities in public policy and warns historians once again
to distinguish between law and practice.
Relatively few blacks and people of colour lived in France, only about 5,000 by
the end of the century, compared with at least 10,000 in England, a country one-
third as populous as France. What is curious is the belief among royal administra-
tors that the number was increasing rapidly and constituted a major social problem
by the 1760s. Peabody traces a double development. On one hand, the Parlement
of Paris and the Admiralty Court of France continued to manumit slaves even into
the 1780s. On the other, after 1762 the central administration, the admiralty courts,
and most parlements in the provinces began to enforce a new code ending all
manumissions, prohibiting intermarriage between races, and registering not only
slaves, but all people of colour in France.
In the first two-thirds of the century French law was strongly influenced by the
Freedom Principle, that is, the notion that once on French soil a slave was free.
This principle was based on a few legal precedents such as an ordinance of Louis
X in 1315 referring to affranchissement of serfs, a case at Bordeaux in 1571 where
the Parlement of Guyenne freed a shipload of slaves, and Loisels Institutes coutu-
mières (1608) and especially later commentators such as Eusèbe de Laurière in
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1710, stressing the maxim that masters must manumit slaves who were baptized.
These precedents were deployed successfully by lawyers defending slaves petitions
for manumission in the early eighteenth century. The case of Jean Boucaux v.
Verdelin in 1738 is an example of a successful case on behalf of Boucaux, a slave
from Saint-Domingue, against his master based on these precedents. Boucaux, ably
defended by two lawyers, was not only freed, but awarded 4,200 livres in back
wages plus interest by the Admiralty Court of France in Paris. By examining the
lists of petitions for freedom before the Admiralty Court of France, Peabody calcu-
lates that 154 slaves won their emancipation by petition and 93 more by individual
acts of manumission between 1730 and 1790. This is the bright side of the story.
On the other hand, royal edicts and regulations had the cumulative effect of
slowing down this flow (or trickle) of manumissions. The edicts of 1716 and 1738
took cognizance of the desire of West Indian planters to bring domestic slaves to
France on a temporary basis under the pretext that they would be given religious
instruction or learn a trade. This phase of control was characterized by permission
of the colonial governor, registration of slaves in the ports, and time limits on
sojourns in France. Before the 1738 declaration, if these formalities were not
observed, the slave could be freed; after 1738, the penalty was immediate return of
the slave to the colonies. These two laws were never registered by the Parlement
of Paris. Peabody also notes that, at this stage, the law employed the word esclave,
not noir.
A major policy shift occurred with the registration of all blacks in Paris in 1762.
The ordinance reflected a change in the attitudes of the royal administration and
perhaps of the political elite in general toward race and a growing fear of racial
pollution. Peabody attributes this shift partly to the development of scientific
racism in the intellectual community and partly to planters claims that slaves who
lived in France became trouble-makers when they returned to the islands. The new
policy was framed in terms of race. As Poncet de la Grave, procureur du roi at the
Admiralty Court, stated the problem: The introduction of too great a quantity of
negroes in France ... is a dangerous consequence. We will soon see the French
nation disfigured if a similar abuse is tolerated. Moreover, the negroes are, in
general, dangerous men (p. 74). This rising fear of a racial menace is surprising,
given the fact that only 159 blacks and people of colour were registered in Paris in
1762, hardly the deluge described by Poncet de la Grave.
In 1777 Antoine de Sartine, Minister of Marine and Colonies, specialist in the
surveillance of Paris, addressed the problem of blacks in France. His legislation
establishing the Police des Noirs replaced the earlier rationale for permitting slaves
to enter France with a pro-planter position against the inconveniences of the
blacks law cases. All lawsuits for freedom, present and future, were suspended.
Sartine ordered the intendants to draw up a census of all blacks (slave or free) in
their departments. Slave domestics who arrived by ship would be confined to dépôts
in the ports of entry. Sartines intent was not only to halt black immigration but
also to encourage the disappearance or absorption of the black population (slave or
free, black or mulatto) already in France. Finally, the new law banned marriages
between whites and blacks, mulattoes, and people of color (p. 118). Fortunately
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for the slaves and people of colour, the Police des Noirs encountered considerable
provincial resistance, and petitions for freedom continued to be granted, albeit at the
same low rate.
To the extent that the policies and court decisions of a relatively small fraction
of the French administration can be attributed to the attitudes of a wider society, the
term political culture is legitimate. My own view is that this public policy,
especially after 1777, reflected both the growing power of the planter lobby and the
growing paranoia of the police power in the face of increasing opposition to the
state, especially at the street level. Blacks were one more identifiable threat, along
with the poor, the grain rioters, the writers of mauvais discours, and the publishers
of sensationalized legal briefs and banned books. Seymour Drescher is surely right
to describe the wider French public as indifferent to the question of slavery. Perhaps
the very lack of slaves and blacks in France explains this. Peabody has told us why
there were so few.
Robert Forster
Johns Hopkins University
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Harold Perkin has written a wonderfully stimulating and provocative account of the
development of our modern world in the last 50 years. It is the last of an unintend-
ed trilogy (p. xi) analysing what he views as crucial turning-points in human
history. The Origins of Modern English Society, 1780–1880, published in 1969, and
The Rise of Professional Society, which followed two decades later, dealt with the
Industrial Revolution and its effects on English society, and with the subsequent
revolution in human organization, again in its English context, characterized by the
rise of the professional classes. In this third volume, Perkin extends his narrative
to the present time and expands it to investigate the development of the professional
elites in much of the post-industrial world: the United States, Britain, France, the
two Germanies, Soviet Russia, and Japan.
A word of caution to those accustomed to more conventional notions about
professionals: Perkins use of the term is in its widest sense, to include not only
the traditional professions, from lawyers and doctors to engineers and accountants,
but also professional bureaucrats in government and professional managers in
business corporations (p. 1). For Perkin, professionals are any knowledge-based
experts who provide special services. In the former Soviet Union, even the nomen-
klatura, the Communist party officials, elites, and intelligentsia, are termed profes-
sionals in that their positions depended on their human capital, assisted by their
political loyalty (p. 23). Public and private sector bureaucrats and managers, in
fact, form the professional elites with which Perkin is concerned, and more
traditional professions are noticeably absent from these pages.
